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Authored by
Matthew E. Luallen, Co-Founder, Encari
Advisors
Paul A. Henry, Certified SANS Instructor, industry veteran and published co-author of books on network security and SCADA; &
Gary J. Finco, Senior Advisory Engineer, Idaho National Laboratory
Electricity provides the foundation on which all of society stands. It has come a long way from the early days, when Thomas Edison and George Westinghouse competed to gain support for their respective DC and AC technologies. Today’s power grids circle the world, providing AC electricity to billions of people. And now these grids themselves are getting smarter, thanks to modern-day technologies supporting what were once decentralized pneumatic manual controls.
Transmissions over these networks involve human operators coupled with advanced computing systems to achieve an intricate balance between the production and consumption of electrons. Fuels such as wind, solar, coal, natural gas, hydro, and nuclear generate electrons that are transmitted long distances and distributed to residential, business, military/government, educational and every other operational community in a civilized society. These electrons provide power to heat, air conditioning, lights, televisions, refrigerators, and even the heart pumps attached to our dearest loved ones.
Each stage of this energy transmission cycle typically includes more than one automated control, or cyber asset. These cyber assets undeniably enhance safety and reliability of the grid network. The problem is, as the grid gets smarter, the propensity for successful cyber intrusion and disablement dramatically increases. These networks are no longer proprietary. They run on commercially-available hardware, operating systems, applications, code, and protocols the bad guys have been exploiting ever since the 1980s.
Consider, as well, the interconnectedness of these transmission networks. In order to buy, sell and transfer various forms of power, these networks must intrinsically connect along supply and distribution routes. For example, energy purchased by the Independent System Operator in Folsom, Calif., might actually come from an Idaho power company that’s selling off excess energy at a discount. This means that security considerations do not end where the speci?c control network does: They continue on through partner connections. In all verticals, partner connections made up 32 percent of breaches investigated, according to the 2009 Verizon Business Breach Report.
This paper will address the security issues facing smarter grid operators and will provide policy advice points.
Click here to download this whitepaper.
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